The Monarchist 1.0
Defending the British Crown Commonwealth and the English-Speaking Peoples
[+] HONOURING OUR PATRON, SIR WINSTON CHURCHILL, VICTOR OF THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES
[+] HONOURING OUR QUEEN, ELIZABETH THE SECOND, ON THE 80TH YEAR OF HER BIRTH (1926 - 2006)
[+] HONOURING OUR KING, SAINT EDWARD THE CONFESSOR, ON THE 1000TH YEAR OF HIS BIRTH (1005 - 2005)
[+] HONOURING OUR HERO, LORD NELSON, ON THE BICENTENNIAL OF THE BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR (1805 - 2005)
[+] HONOURING OUR SONS, THE QUEEN'S COMMONWEALTH SOLDIERS KILLED IN THE 'WAR ON TERROR'
Chief Warrant Officer Robert Girouard, 46, Royal Canadian Regiment, Nov 27, 2006 (Afstan)
Staff Sergeant Sharron Elliott, 34, Intelligence Corps, Nov 12, 2006 (Iraq)
Private Jacob B. Kovco, 25, Royal Australian Regiment, April 21, 2006
[+] HONOURING OUR VETS ON THE 150TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE VICTORIA CROSS (1856 - 2006)
Friday, July 14, 2006
The Trouble with Salutin
Rick Salutin tells us (“At the ready, but where’s the war?” July 7) that the CIA has declared that the leadership of Al Qaeda, formerly headquartered in Afghanistan, no longer constitutes a threat to Western security. If this is true, and if the CIA is right, I am relieved. However, I have a little trouble with where Salutin goes from there.
He tells us that the flourishing of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan during the late 1990s and the Taliban rule of that country during the same period were fundamentally unrelated circumstances (“they’d probably have dealt Osama to the U.S. for some aid and security”). He goes on to imply that the Taliban actually were, and presumably remain, a force for good (“they… had established a modicum of stability and had no international terror pretensions.”)
Interesting. It is, of course, possible that the geographical and temporal coincidence of the rise of the Taliban and that of Al Qaeda could have been simple accident. In considering the credibility of such a possibility, however, a few facts – unmentioned by Salutin – deserve citation. The rules and laws brought into general application in Afghanistan by the Taliban bear an astonishing resemblance to those advocated for worldwide application by Al Qaeda. To recall, those laws made refusal of fidelity to Islam a capital offence, and required women to abstain from education, employment, independent mobility, and appearance in public - except swaddled head-to-toe in cloth - on pain of corporal or worse punishment. Such a close similarity of ideology more than suggests a likelihood of mutual sympathy and aid. More practically: we know that the leadership of Al Qaeda and that of the Taliban did in fact share each others’ hospitality and resources, extending to intermarriage, and to fleeing, hiding and fighting together when the U.S. moved against Al Qaeda post-9/11. Further: quite contrary to Salutin’s claim, the Taliban in 2001 openly and defiantly affirmed their allegiance to Al Qaeda at precisely the moment when an opposite declaration and action would have secured to them boundless reward, rather than utter ruin, at American hands. As for the Taliban bringing “stability” to Afghanistan: if I not mistaken, many people around the world said the same of the Nazis and Germany during the 1930s.
Less important than Salutin’s interpretation of the past is his recipe for the future. His implied recommendation is that Canada and other nations should refuse the Afghan government’s request for continuing security assistance. Presumably Salutin understands that such a course would lead directly and promptly to the re-conquest of Afghanistan by the Taliban. What, I wonder, are the mechanisms Salutin imagines would guarantee a Taliban reversal of their past attitude toward civil society and civil rights (assuming he sees anything wrong with that attitude), and that international terrorism would not again be incubated under their noses? Ah, that’s right: no guarantees necessary. The Taliban are a force for good, and their apparent tolerance of Al Qaeda leaders and training camps was just coincidence - kind of like the Liberals and corruption. Perhaps Salutin’s interpretation of the past is relevant after all?
POSTED by WALSINGHAM and CROSS POSTED to THE TORCH
POSTED BY: The Monarchist AT 9:51 a.m. | LINKS |
Rick Salutin tells us (“At the ready, but where’s the war?” July 7) that the CIA has declared that the leadership of Al Qaeda, formerly headquartered in Afghanistan, no longer constitutes a threat to Western security. If this is true, and if the CIA is right, I am relieved. However, I have a little trouble with where Salutin goes from there.
He tells us that the flourishing of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan during the late 1990s and the Taliban rule of that country during the same period were fundamentally unrelated circumstances (“they’d probably have dealt Osama to the U.S. for some aid and security”). He goes on to imply that the Taliban actually were, and presumably remain, a force for good (“they… had established a modicum of stability and had no international terror pretensions.”)
Interesting. It is, of course, possible that the geographical and temporal coincidence of the rise of the Taliban and that of Al Qaeda could have been simple accident. In considering the credibility of such a possibility, however, a few facts – unmentioned by Salutin – deserve citation. The rules and laws brought into general application in Afghanistan by the Taliban bear an astonishing resemblance to those advocated for worldwide application by Al Qaeda. To recall, those laws made refusal of fidelity to Islam a capital offence, and required women to abstain from education, employment, independent mobility, and appearance in public - except swaddled head-to-toe in cloth - on pain of corporal or worse punishment. Such a close similarity of ideology more than suggests a likelihood of mutual sympathy and aid. More practically: we know that the leadership of Al Qaeda and that of the Taliban did in fact share each others’ hospitality and resources, extending to intermarriage, and to fleeing, hiding and fighting together when the U.S. moved against Al Qaeda post-9/11. Further: quite contrary to Salutin’s claim, the Taliban in 2001 openly and defiantly affirmed their allegiance to Al Qaeda at precisely the moment when an opposite declaration and action would have secured to them boundless reward, rather than utter ruin, at American hands. As for the Taliban bringing “stability” to Afghanistan: if I not mistaken, many people around the world said the same of the Nazis and Germany during the 1930s.
Less important than Salutin’s interpretation of the past is his recipe for the future. His implied recommendation is that Canada and other nations should refuse the Afghan government’s request for continuing security assistance. Presumably Salutin understands that such a course would lead directly and promptly to the re-conquest of Afghanistan by the Taliban. What, I wonder, are the mechanisms Salutin imagines would guarantee a Taliban reversal of their past attitude toward civil society and civil rights (assuming he sees anything wrong with that attitude), and that international terrorism would not again be incubated under their noses? Ah, that’s right: no guarantees necessary. The Taliban are a force for good, and their apparent tolerance of Al Qaeda leaders and training camps was just coincidence - kind of like the Liberals and corruption. Perhaps Salutin’s interpretation of the past is relevant after all?
POSTED by WALSINGHAM and CROSS POSTED to THE TORCH
POSTED BY: The Monarchist AT 9:51 a.m. | LINKS |
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